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Introduction 
 
Thank you Professor Cahn 
 
I appreciate the opportunity to share my views; these are my views and not those of 
Citigroup. 
 
It has become popular for journalists who are trying to sell newspapers, and politicians 
who are trying to solicit votes, to refer to this financial crisis as the worst since the Great 
Depression or WWII.  I don’t know whether it is the worst or not so will leave that 
question to the historians and economists of the future once the storm has past.  But it is 
indeed a  “storm” as described  by  Vince Cable, Member of Parliament in his UK 
bestselling book entitled “The Storm – The World Economic Crisis and What it Means”.  
He describes this “storm” as a very destructive one displacing jobs, businesses, banks 
and whole economies from Iceland to the United Kingdom to  the United States. 
 
I propose to offer a short chronology and summary of the causes of the current economic 
crisis.  Then I will review several of the regulatory responses to the crisis focusing on the 
Turner Report, the de Larosière Group and certain US Treasury statements.  I will offer 
my critiques of these proposals and then make some predictions of what the financial 
services industry may look like in the future. 
 
 
I.  Chronology of the Financial Crisis 
 
Rather than offer a detailed chronology that will be all too familiar to those of you 
who read the Economist or the FT, I will divide the financial crisis into three 
phases.  While it is not necessarily correct to divide it this way I think it is a useful 
paradigm to see how the financial crisis has progressed. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1  Chief Legal Officer for Citi’s Europe, Middle East and Africa division in London 
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A.  The Burst of the Sub-Prime Housing Bubble in the United States and 
Contagion to Other Asset Classes    
 
  In the first and second quarters of 2007, cracks begin to appear in the US sub-
prime residential mortgage market.  If very few people knew what sub-prime 
mortgages were in 2007, I believe everyone has an idea and an opinion of sub-
prime mortgages today.   HSBC warned its investors in the first quarter of 
2007 that the frequency of defaults and the severity of the losses were 
beginning to rise in its US residential sub-prime mortgage portfolio.   
 
  These sub-prime  mortgages were originated by local banks or mortgage 
brokers and then aggregated and distributed into the capital markets by large 
international banks through CDOs (Collaterized Debt Obligations).  CDOs in 
this context are pools of sub-prime mortgages whereby the underlying cash 
flows are tranched from equity (first loss – typically 5%), junior and senior 
mezzanine (the next 25-35% of cash flow and are distributed to institutional 
investors and traded OTC) and finally to the Super Senior (top 60-70% and 
typically held by the bank that structured the CDO).  The market value of 
these CDOs is tracked by the ABX index.  In reaction to the increase in the 
frequency of the defaults, this index began to decline substantially in the 
second and third quarter of 2007 by 20 to 30 points.  The marked to market 
(MTM) losses and the concomitant margin calls led to the unwinding of two 
Bear Stearns funds in June of 2007. 
 
  By September,  contagion impacted other mortgage products and  other 
complex structured credit.  Again, MTM losses and margin calls led to fire 
sales and liquidity for certain vehicles began to seize up.  KfW steps in to 
provide liquidity for IKB, eventually taking it over.  There is a run on a 
mortgage bank in the UK, Northern  Rock,  that precipitates a minor 
government crisis.  Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) around the globe 
start to have difficulty rolling their commercial paper (CP) which was used to 
fund their longer dated mortgage portfolio.  SIVs are highly geared funds (30 
plus to one) that buy long-dated mortgages and fund in the CP market with no, 
or minimal, backstop bank liquidity.  SIV portfolios can have both prime and 
sub-prime exposures in their portfolios. 
 
  Also, in this timeframe the leveraged loan market trades off considerably and 
a number of big international banks get stuck with some very large loans.  The 
leveraged loan market  is a traditional bank market, but recently, non-bank 
institutions have begun to participate through CLOs (Collateralised Loan 
Obligations  – the parent of CDOs).  The leveraged loan market funded 
leverage buyouts by private equity firms and strategic acquisitions by 
industry.  I leave it to economists and finance majors to determine the actual 
relationship between the sub-prime bubble and the leveraged loan market, but 
certainly by the third quarter of 2007 the financial and capital markets had two 
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marked  down considerably with liquidity  seizing up.  Consequently in 
October, Merrill, Citi,  UBS, JPM and other major global banks  begin to 
announce considerable (tens of billions of US$) losses attributable to marks 
on these two asset classes. 
 
 
B.  Liquidity Crisis 
 
  I do agree  that it is artificial to divide the chronology into a credit crisis 
precipitated by the sub-prime housing bubble bursting and a separate liquidity 
crisis.  It is a continuum and there is no logical break.   Having said that, by 
September of 2008 and the bankruptcy of Lehman there is a fully-fledge loss 
of confidence in the entire banking and financial system and it is no longer a 
sub-prime crisis, or for that matter even a credit crunch.  Sub-prime crisis, to 
credit crunch, to liquidity squeeze, to systemic failure all within the space of 
little over a year.  Today sub-prime losses represent something in the order of 
15% of the total MTM losses. 
 
  The credit crunch and liquidity problems continue to intensify through the end 
of 2007 and the beginning of 2008.  This causes the CP market to dry up, 
SIVs to be wound up or supported by their bank sponsor, the municipal 
auction rate securities
2 market in the United States to trade off and requiring 
the US government to assist a rescue of Bear Stearns by JPM in March 2008.  
Without access to the Fed window through JPM, Bear Stearns had no liquidity 
in the market place. 
 
  In the first and second quarters of 2008, banks went out to their shareholders 
and new investors to replenish their capital, raising tens of billions in new 
capital and central banks pumped liquidity into the system.  I remember one 
meeting between Sir Win Bischoff, then Citi’s chairman, and Hector Sants, 
CEO of the FSA, where Sir Win was reviewing all the capital that Citi had 
raised in the Middle East.  Sir Win said to Hector “We’ll go out and get the 
capital and governments and central banks should provide the liquidity.” 
 
  Further MTM losses and liquidity strains require the US government to 
effectively step in and support Fannie and Freddie (the two government 
sponsored mortgage giants) in the summer of 2008. 
 
  September 2008, more than a year after the crisis began, is the worst month.  
Deposit runs lead to the default/liquidation/nationalization of certain Icelandic 
banks, Bradford & Bingley in the UK, WAMU in the US and a number of 
banks in the EU.  But the biggest bomb to explode was the week beginning on 
Monday 8 September when the US government effectively nationalized AIG 
(current tab of $185B), orchestrated the takeover of Merrill Lynch by Bank of 
                                                     
2  Auction rate securities (ARS) are remarketed preferred stock that approximated commercial paper for US 
municipals.  These securities are typically wrapped up by AAA rated monolines.  These monolines ran into 
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America and, inexplicably, let Lehman fail.  Those who have been crying 
“moral hazard” got what they had been calling for – global financial systemic 
gridlock!!  Several days later Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs apply to 
become bank holding companies with access to the Fed window for liquidity.  
The entirety of the US broker/dealer giants disappeared, were swallowed up or 
converted into bank holding companies. 
 
  Now governments had to provide both the capital and liquidity.  The range of 
government responses included providing direct equity or preferred stock 
capital, funding guarantees of interbank borrowings, direct asset purchases, 
insurance of certain bad assets and recapitalizations.  This degree of 
government intervention around the world across the entire spectrum of the 
private finance/banking sector has not happened since the Great Depression. 
 
 
C.  Full Blown Recession 
 
Popular wisdom of where we are today is that the f inancial crisis is now 
impairing the real economy.  We are in the midst of the steepest deflation that 
we have seen in decades.  Unemployment is increasing and has not peaked.  
The severity of the housing price collapse in a number of countries has not 
peaked.  Consumer spending in the US, UK and Europe is in rapid decline.  
Credit card and consumer finance credit defaults are rising.  There has been a 
flight to the $ and Euro, and devaluations of a number of emerging market 
currencies.  The decline in the value of these currencies has not led to an 
export boom as the US and Europe is contracting.  Sales of manufactured 
goods are way down and inventories have been rising.  In short, we find 
ourselves in the middle of an old-fashioned recession.  It remains to be seen 
how long it will run or how deep (severe) it will be.  But I leave it to the 
historians and the economists to divine the links between the financial crisis 
and this recession.  Having said that, our Citi economists estimate that the US 
consumer has lost $19 trillion, or 20%, of his/her net worth and it will take 
many years to recover this before US consumer spending and confidence are 
fully restored. 
 
 
D.  The Future - Government Deficits – Currency Devaluation - Inflation 
 
I will offer a prediction of the next phase of this crisis – government deficits.  
The UK and the US, in particular, have embarked on huge stimulus spending 
programmes.  This will create government deficits not seen since the Vietnam 
War, which could lead to inflation and currency instability.    This pressure on 
the US dollar  could force the world to assess the need for an alternative 
reserve currency to the US$.  You have already seen the Chinese suggest that 
there should be an IMF controlled central bank currency as an alternative to 
the dollar.  This could be the most serious threat to dollar supremacy in the 
post-World War II era.  You see, I can be more hyperbolic than a journalist! 
 Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  5
II.  Causes of the Crisis 
 
A.  Macro-Economic 
 
This is largely taken from the Turner Report, not because the Turner report is 
necessarily right (though it may be), but because it is the most comprehensive 
and thoughtful piece to come out from the Chairman of  a very influential 
regulator, the UK FSA, and we ought to try and understand what the regulator 
is trying to accomplish. 
 
Over the last decade, OPEC, Japan, China and other exporters accumulated 
large account surpluses and US, UK and others in the EU running account 
deficits, which created  large imbalances.  These exporters invested in US 
government bonds and other AAA obligations (including CDOs) driving the 
cost of borrowing down.  This build-up of liquidity and low interest rates over 
an extended period funded a housing bubble in the US and UK. 
 
The “irrational exuberance” in the US and UK housing markets was further 
exacerbated by the “originate to distribute” model and product innovation (or 
product complexity).  This combination allowed banks to take mortgages off 
their books and distribute them to the capital markets and a broader group of 
investors. Three or four years ago, it was the  received wisdom that the 
“originate to distribute” approach to complex traded mortgage products better 
distributed mortgage risk throughout the financial system and banks were 
more diversified.   Unfortunately today, what was heralded as the Holy Grail 
for diversification of bank risk turned out to be a poisoned chalice.  
Unfortunately, banks had to make markets  in CDOs, create large 
“warehouses” of sub-prime mortgages for contribution to CDOs and hold the 
Super Senior, which turned out not to live up to its name.   
 
Lord Turner goes on to make the point that the financial sector and debt grew 
at an unprecedented pace over the last decade.  The growth in the financial 
sector outpaced growth in the corporate and retail sectors.  
 
Increased leverage and complex structured products with limited historical 
data on their volatility were sold on a risk-weighted pricing assumption of 
liquidity and then liquidity disappeared. 
 
 
B.  Failure of Risk Processes 
 
Lord Turner refers to this as misplaced reliance on sophisticated maths and 
models.  I am sure I am not doing justice to Lord Turner’s explanation but I 
will  attempt to  reduce his analysis to three points: 1) VAR didn’t work 
because it didn’t take account of product complexity; 2) bank risk models 
assumed liquidity (confidence) and ceased to work when liquidity 
(confidence) disappeared; and 3) the limited historical data around some of 
the new complex products did not allow banks to identify “fat tails.”  In other Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  6
words, if your risk model should provide capital for a once in fifty year event 
and the product has only been around for a decade, then you most likely have 
not collected enough data points in order to identify all of the tail risk. 
 
 
C.  Failure of Supervision/Regulation 
 
Basel II rested on two pillars which lie in ruins today: 1) reliance on internal 
bank models of risk and 2) credit ratings.  I’ve mentioned why Lord Turner 
believes models failed.  The credit rating agencies (CRAs) did give the Super 
Senior tranches and other structured credit product AAA ratings.  In hindsight, 
CRAs (as well as the industry and regulators) did not recognize the correlated 
nature of the risks with CDOs.  The modelling assumptions were unrealistic 
(i.e., assuming house price appreciation forever).  None of the CRAs,  the 
regulators or the banks ran stress scenarios that had house prices down 30-
40% or double digit unemployment. 
 
Everyone forgot the importance of liquidity to the banks.  Hugo Banzinger, 
the chief risk officer at Deutsche Bank, said at a conference here in Frankfurt 
in the first half of 2007 (I paraphrase..): I do not understand why regulators 
ask me to focus on capital.  I have two metrics that I watch every day – cash 
flow and liquidity.  If I do not have good cash flow and liquidity and I hit a 
market disruption event, by the time I get to capital I am bankrupt.  I have 
often thought how prescient Mr. Banzinger’s comment was.  Regulators and 
banks did not focus enough on liquidity.  Lehman had significant of capital 
when it went under, but it simply had no liquidity 
 
 
D.  “Shadow Banking” of Financial Institutions Outside of Systemic Regime. 
 
This has been a perennial weakness in the global bank regulatory regime, 
which allows systemically important institutions to stand outside of the bank 
capital, prudential supervision and systemic confidence regulatory oversight 
regime.  This has been particularly problematic in the US with its archaic and 
Byzantine financial regulatory structure.   
 
The world now understands that the US broker dealer industry  operated 
outside of a robust capital regime and did not have access to the lender of last 
resort in the US - the Fed.  In the space of a little over a year, every major US 
broker was either bankrupt, taken over by a commercial bank or converted 
into a bank holding company under the umbrella of Fed supervision with 
access to the  Fed  window.  AIG, Freddie and Fannie are other failed 
institutions outside of the central bank’s reach.  A credible argument could be 
made that the fact that these broker dealers (Lehman, Merrill Lynch and Bear 
Stearns) had no effective regulatory supervision and oversight of capital and 
liquidity and, more importantly, no access to the Fed widow, created the 
liquidity crisis.  Certainly Lehman’s bankruptcy is the most critical event, 
triggering systemic loss of confidence. Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  7
 
Another old villain here is the hedge fund industry.   While hedge funds did 
not play a central role in creating the crisis, the fact that they, by definition, 
are leverage animals meant that the credit crunch caused them to rapidly de-
leverage thus driving down prices and aggravating the MTM with the banks. 
 
 
E.  Credit Rating Agencies 
 
In addition to the model and stress problems outlined above, the “issuer pays” 
model in the structured credit arena has come in for some criticism because of 
conflicts of interest.  Indeed, the entire methodology for rating structured 
credit has come under critique. 
 
 
III.  Regulatory Response 
   
A.  Turner Report  
 
I will not cover every aspect of  Lord Turner’s recommendations, only the 
more important ones related to the causes outlined above and which are likely 
to have the greatest impact on the future shape of the banking industry. 
 
1.  Capital.  (Surprise, surprise … the industry will be required to hold more 
capital) 
 
-  increase amount of bank capital (quantity and quality) 
 
-  3-5 x increase in trading book capital 
 
-  pro and counter-cyclical capital buffers – build reserves in the good 
times   
 
-  gross leverage ratio/no risk weighting 
 
2.    Liquidity.  Local or entity level liquidity management.  FSA has a 
consultation paper  on liquidity management.  Intense dedicated 
supervision of liquidity.  Establish a core funding ratio. 
 
3.    Accounting.  Published accounts should include “Economic Cycle 
Reserve” as an IBNR disclosed on Financial Statements but not run 
through the balance sheet. 
 
4.    Institutional and geographic coverage of regulation – “shadow banking”.  
Regulators should have the power to extend prudential regulation of 
capital and liquidity to an institution if it has bank-like features, or can 
otherwise threaten financial stability, or otherwise becomes systemically 
significant Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  8
 
5.    Credit Rating Agencies –should be subject to registration, and greater 
supervision to oversee  disclosure, conflicts, transparency, ratings, 
models and, most importantly, the ratings of structured credit. 
 
6.    Remuneration.  Regulation to ensure compensation policies  that 
discourage excessive risk taking. 
 
7.    Enhanced bank supervision through 1) a local supervisory entrance 
programme (up close and personal); 2) increased prominence of risk 
management in governance process; 3) colleges of regulators;  and 4) 
pre-emptive crisis co-ordination. 
 
8.    Utility banking versus investment banking.  One of the more 
controversial goals of the Turner recommendations is that, through the 
combination of higher capital charges on the trading book and higher 
liquidity requirements, universal banks should shed proprietary trading 
businesses and become utility commercial banks.  Commercial banks 
will have the benefit of depositor protection and provide a simple array 
of financial products and services to consumers.  These “utility banks” 
would be the banks of the future that governments should bail out and 
the much smaller investment/merchant banks would be left to their fate 
and moral hazard.  Lord Turner says this is not Glass Steagall revisited, 
in my mind it is Glass Steagall by capital and liquidity regulation. 
 
9.    Lord Turner does recommend the evolution of the Lamfalussy process 
and the creation of a super European institution with independent 
authority for rule making and input to macro prudential analysis.  Who 
would have imagined  the Chairman of the UK FSA would ever 
recommend creating such  an EU leviathan?  While supervision will 
continue at the national level, he recommends another level of oversight 
and coordination at the EU level. 
 
10.  Another controversial recommendation, and one I believe is at odds with 
the uber-Euro regulator, is that Lord Turner suggests increasing national 
powers to require subsidiarisation of EU banks’ branches that take retail 
deposits cross border.  In other words, to stop EU passporting cross 
border without greater local supervision of the local subsidiary.    This is 
a reaction to the failure of the Icelandic banks and the inability of British 
citizens to access the Icelandic depositor protection. 
 
B.  The de Larosière Group 
 
On 25 February 2009 a high-level group headed by former IMF Managing 
Director and ex-Bank of France Governor, Jacques de Larosière, recommended 
reform of cross-border financial supervision in the EU to remedy flaws in the 
bloc's patchwork of national based supervision. Faced with member state fears of Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  9
losing local regulatory sovereignty, the report suggests changes should be phased 
-in over four years and stops short of introducing an all-powerful, pan-EU 
regulator. The report offers a two-level approach to reform - new oversight of 
broad, system-wide risks and a beefing-up of coordination a mong national 
supervisors.  The Report's main recommendations are: 
MARKET-WIDE SUPERVISION OF RISK 
•  Setting up a "European Systemic Risk Council" (ESRC) to be chaired by the 
European Central Bank president. It would be composed of members of the 
general council of  the  ECB, a member of the European Commission and 
chairs of the three existing pan-EU committees of banking, insurance and 
securities supervisors. 
•  Establishing an effective risk warning system under the auspices of the ESRC 
and the existing Economic and Financial Committee, which is made up of 
national treasury officials. If the ESRC thinks a local supervisor is taking 
inadequate action to deal with risk, it could take further action. 
•  Making improvements in how a banking crisis is handled. For example, EU 
states should agree more detailed criteria for burden sharing and who bails out 
a failed cross-border bank. 
DAY-TO-DAY SUPERVISION 
•  Creating a “European System of Financial Supervisors” (ESFS) and a 
decentralised network, with existing national supervisors continuing to carry 
out day to day supervision.  
•  Three new European authorities would be set up to replace the existing three 
pan-EU committees of banking, insurance and securities supervisors known as 
CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR. Colleges of supervisors would be set up for all 
major cross-border institutions. 
•  The ESFS would be independent of political authorities but be accountable to 
them. It should rely on a common set of core harmonised rules. 
REGULATORY REFORM 
•  A fundamental review is needed for the globally-agreed Basel II rules on 
capital requirements for banks, such as stricter rules for off balance sheet 
items.  
•  Supervisors should oversee the suitability of compensation policies at 
financial institutions. 
•  A common EU definition of regulatory capital should be adopted. Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  10
•  National supervisors should collectively be responsible for registering and 
supervising credit rating agencies.  
•  A wider reflection needed on mark-to-market accounting standards, blamed 
by some for exacerbating the impact of the credit crunch on banks. The 
oversight and governance of the International Accounting Standards Board, 
which sets accounting standards used in the EU, should be strengthened.  
Neither Lord Turner nor the US authorities blame MTM for exacerbating the 
crisis.  US authorities are more concerned about a level playing field. 
•  Regulation should be extended to the so-called parallel banking system, and 
there should be registration and information requirements on all major hedge 
funds. There should be capital requirements on banks owning or operating a 
hedge fund or engaged in significant activity with a hedge fund.  
 
C.  US Approach 
 
1.  Systemically Important Firms 
 
Interconnected firms and markets need to be subject to greater regulatory scrutiny 
and supervision to ensure that the risks these firms pose to the financial system 
are understood and managed.  Systemically important firms will be identified by 
certain characteristics such as: (1) the financial system’s interdependence with the 
firm; (2) the firm’s size; (3) the firm’s level of leverage; (4) the firm’s reliance on 
short-term funding; and (5) the firm’s importance as a source of credit and 
liquidity to other market participants. 
 
2.  A resolution and stability regulatory authority 
 
A single entity would have responsibility for systemic stability of systemically 
important financial firms and markets.  This regulatory authority would be 
responsible for consolidated supervision of these firms and supervision of 
systemically important payment and settlement systems and activities.   
 
3.  Capital and liquidity requirements 
 
In order to prevent future crises, firms will be required to hold greater capital and 
to build up higher capital levels during good economic times in order to have the 
ability to survive downturns.  This non-pro-cyclical requirement would avoid the 
high levels of deleveraging during economic downturns that have exacerbated the 
current crisis.  The capital levels of those institutions which pose potential risks to 
the stability of the financial system will also be substantially increased to match 
the systemic risk they pose. 
 
The single stability regulator, it is proposed, would impose tough liquidity 
management requirements for systemically important financial firms, including a Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  11
requirement to be able to aggregate counterparty risk exposures hourly on an 
enterprise-wide basis. 
 
4.  Regulation of hedge funds and other private pools of capital 
 
Advisers to large hedge funds and other private pools of capital should register 
with the SEC, and are subject to disclosure requirements and regulatory reporting 
to enable the authorities to assess the level of threat they pose.  Secretary Geithner 
stated that this will apply to fund advisers with assets under management in 
excess of a certain threshold, but did not provide details on this threshold level. 
 
5.  Reducing runs on money market funds 
 
In the United States, money market funds “broke a buck” because of runs by 
investors.  While money market funds are subject to SEC regulation, the SEC 
should strengthen regulation to enhance liquidity, capital and asset quality. 
 
 
IV.  The Banking Model of the Future 
 
•   There are two long-term trends in the financial services sector – universal 
banks and globalization – that have combined to make the consequences of 
this financial crisis more severe and the regulatory solutions more complex. 
 
•   Lord Turner, I believe, is quoted as saying “in life banks are global and in 
death they are national”.  This summarises the fundamental problem with the 
banking sector in this crisis in that universal global banks have had to be 
bailed out by national economies.  Banks that became too big to fail have also 
become too big to save.  You only have to look at Switzerland, the UK and 
Iceland to see that you have global banks that exceed the national capacity to 
bail them out.  The proposals in the Turner report and the other regulatory 
changes that I have described, aim to correct this situation by a combination of 
increasing capital on global systemic banks, reducing the gross leverage 
within the financial sector and therefore the size of these banks, and then, 
through local liquidity and capital requirements, making global banks more 
decentralized and responsive to local supervision. 
 
•    Capital, Capital and more Capital.  While given the bleak capital status of 
banks and the financial system and the massive government intervention to 
save many banks and the system itself, it is hard to argue against an increase 
in capital requirements.  Having said that, it is important to ask yourself what 
the impact of greater capital requirements will be.  I ncreased capital 
requirements will make banks less profitable. Bank profits are the quickest 
and surest way to increase bank capital.  Increased capital requirements may 
drive the cost up of goods and services delivered to retail and institutional 
customers.  It may also reduce availability of certain products.  Driving up the 
costs of mortgages, for example,  and reducing the overall mortgage lending 
capacity will put home ownership out of reach of a larger percentage of the Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  12
population, require homeowners to allocate larger percentage of their income 
to repaying their mortgages and drive down the value of homes.  All of this 
could exacerbate the recession.  This is a policy choice between “guns and 
butter”.  You can have more capital in the banking system and presumably 
more systemic stability, but you will also get less mortgage capacity (for 
example) at a higher cost. 
 
•   Large increases in trading book capital which has as one of it objectives the 
dismemberment of universal banks into their parts.  As I said earlier, Lord 
Turner is targeting the universal bank through exponential increases in trading 
book capital and liquidity management.  This  is likely to  bring about the 
return of Glass Steagall only this time across the globe with utility banks 
delivering retail products and services and enjoying depositor protection.  
Investment banks, hedge funds and merchant banks will be outside of these 
utility banks.  They too will have massive capital requirements as well as a 
gross leverage ratios limits.  Between not being part of utility banks and 
having very onerous capital and leverage limits, these banks will be permitted 
to fail without systemic implications.  What surprises me about this aversion 
to global universal banks and preference for smaller utility banks  is that 
monoline brokers and mortgage banks faired worse than universal banks in 
the crisis.  Indeed, HSBC and some of the Spanish global universal banks 
weathered the storm quite well.  Global universal banks h ave a more 
diversified risk portfolio, which may not have worked perfectly in this current 
crisis but that is no reason to throw the baby out with the bath water  – 
diversification in asset classes both  from geographic and wholesale/retail 
perspectives should lead to more stable institutions than monoline single risk 
entities. 
 
•   Balkanization – Branch capital and liquidity, or trapped capital and liquidity 
within local entities, could result in centrally managed banks becoming 
decentralized federations of national banks.  Instead of global banks with 
centralized product, liquidity management, capital and distribution, a small 
geographic entity model will develop.  These local banks, or branches, will be 
smaller and more responsible to local regulators, but less efficient.  If every 
country did what the UK FSA is currently proposing with regard to liquidity 
and capital, this Balkanization would lead to considerable inefficiency in the 
deployment of liquidity and capital by global universal banks, exacerbating 
the current liquidity and capital crisis. 
 
•   Large increases in trading book capital on securitization capital products will 
stifle the recovery of the capital markets.  Capital markets investors have 
greatly expanded the funding capacity of the traditional bank markets.  So, for 
example, increased capital charges on securitization capital products will drive 
the overall mortgage/securitization capacity down in the US and UK 
especially.  In the US the capital markets and wholesale investors provided 
something in the order of 75-80% of the US mortgage capacity and banks 
provided the remainder.  In the UK, that relationship was reversed.  In either 
country, however, if you impose punitive capital charges on a secondary Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  13
securitisation product such that it substantially reduces the size of these 
markets there will not be enough bank capacity to make up the shortfall.  A 
very important objective in solving this crisis is to revive liquidity in the 
secondary market for securitization or mortgage products.  Punitive capital 
charges on these types of asset classes undermine this objective.   
 
•   In many respects, Lord Turner’s vision of utility banks and investment banks 
reminds me of Frank Capra’s 1940s classic “It’s a Wonderful Life”; Jimmy 
Stewart and the Bailey Brothers’  Building and Loan Association taking 
deposits from the community and reinvesting in homes for the community’s 
working and middle classes, with the evil Mr. Potter and his big global bank 
trying to thwart the Bailey Brothers at every turn.  Unfortunately that is the 
past and we cannot return to it.  Banks will continue to provide a wide array of 
financial products and services because that is what retail and wholesale 
customers want.  The world economy is far more globally connected than that 
of Capra’s Bedford Falls in 1945.  Banks of the future will need to be global 
to match the globality of business and economies.  It may be necessary to 
have larger capital charges for these universal systemic global banks because 
no one nation is able to provide sufficient support in a time of crisis, but it is 
not a solution to break universal banks up into utility and commercial banks, 
nor is it a solution to divide them into a confederation of stand-alone national 
banks.  The economy is global.  Banks will be global.  Regulation and 
regulators need to be global. 
 
•    Growth of “shadow banking”.  Between compensation regulation and greater 
capital requirements, the “brain drain” will cause entrepreneurial talent to find 
space outside of the bank regulatory regime.  If g overnments create an 
arbitrage regarding capital and compensation, individuals and entities will 
spend considerable time and effort to find a jurisdiction, corporate 
organisation or tax regime that takes advantage of this arbitrage.    So, rather 
than bringing more systemically relevant institutions into the bank regulatory 
environment you run the risk of many institutions and individuals fleeing 
further into the shadows, away from the bank regulatory environment. 
 
•    Gross leverage and the decline in the reliance of internal bank models will 
reduce innovation and reward mediocrity.  While I agree with Lord Turner 
that models and sophisticated maths did not work as anticipated in this crisis, I 
would not recommend throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  We still 
want to encourage improvements in risk management analytics.  But if there is 
no reward for improvements in this area and all banks are treated equally, then 
innovation will stagnate.   
 
•    Let’s turn to the regulatory front.  The rise of international colleges with 
greater coordination and communication regarding large systemically relevant 
financial institutions has already begun, and will accelerate. 
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•    A large systemic and prudential regulator will arise in the US.  I believe this 
will be the Fed.  I do not believe that the SEC and the CFTC will come within 
the orbit of the Fed.   
 
•    The next stage of Lamfalussy and the rise of two new EU institutions: an 
independent macro prudential surveillance authority; and some sort of pan-EU 
supervisory authority with rule making power.  Both Lord Turner and the de 
Larosière groups support this.  I believe this will impact London’s 
competitiveness.  The key for this entity  is  not only to impose liquidity, 
capital and prudential supervision standards for systemically important 
institutions but also to be able to partner with ECB to be a lender of last resort 
in Europe.  In addition this futuristic Leviathan should also have sufficient 
resources and authority to ensure financial systemic stability across the entire 
EU.   
 
•    Through the combination of colleges and single systemic and prudential 
regulators in the US and EU, you will have enhanced communication and co-
ordination in the future.  Those two  giant regulators will sit atop the two 
economies ($ and Eurozone) that have the capacity to fund large global 
universal banks and therefore will be better positioned to manage the size, 
capital, liquidity etc of the banking sector in the future. 
 
•    In other words, the problem with this crisis is that the regulatory solution was 
national when the banks and the banking crisis were global. This is not to say 
that banks are blameless, or that the total solution does not require changes 
with bank capital, risk management and liquidity enhancements, but the 
solution must also involve making regulators more global.  The problem is not 
that banks got too big or too global.  The problem is that regulation and the 
regulator did not keep pace with the globalization of the economy and banks 
and remained national.   The solution is not to make banks and the banking 
system take a step backwards to the Bailey Building and Loan Association, 
but to make governments and regulators take a step forward and become more 
global and more co-ordinated rather than purely national. 
 
 
*    *    *    *    *    * 
 
 
I picked up this weekend John Kenneth Galbraith’s short essay – “A Short History of 
Financial Euphoria” written in the aftermath of the 1987 stock crash.  From Tulip mania, 
to John Law and the Banque Royal, to  the South Sea Bubble, to numerous American real 
estate bubbles of the 19
th century and finally to the legendary 1929 stock market crash, a 
free enterprise economy continually  gives itself over to “irrational exuberance” or 
episodes of speculation and greed.  Galbraith concludes his short essay by saying:  “The 
final question that remains is what, if anything should be done?  Recurrent descent into 
insanity is not a wholly attractive feature of capitalism.  The human cost is not negligible, 
nor is the economic and social effect…..Yet beyond a better perception of speculative 
tendency and process itself, there probably is not a great deal that can be done.  Bgans\current and futureimplications.doc  15
Regulation outlawing financial incredulity or mass euphoria is not a practical possibility.”  
I am not so pessimistic as to say; therefore, let’s do nothing since financial bubbles are 
inevitable.  On the other hand, I am enough of a pragmatist to suggest that this financial 
crisis does not require wholesale revision of the bank regulatory regime.  The lesson of 
history is that we cannot outlaw “irrational exuberance”, we can only be more vigilant in 
our efforts to identify the next expanding bubble and then more prudential in how to 
deflate it without bursting it. I 
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